ISSUE: Did this Oklahoma Statute violate the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women.

REASONING: Justice Brennan: The gender classifications made by the Oklahoma statute were unconstitutional because the statistics relied on by the state were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the statute and the benefits intended to stem from it. Furthermore, the Court found that the analysis of the Equal Protection Clause in this case had not been changed by the subsequently passed Twenty-first Amendment. The Court came up with an Intermediate Scrutiny, whereby the state must prove the existence of specific important governmental objectives, and that the law must be substantially related to the achievement of those opinions, if gender is used as a classification. As to third party rights, the court, expanding on the doctrine of standing, held that the vendors of 3.2% beer will be economically affected due to the restrictive nature of the sales to males between 18 and 20. To have standing, one must show a “nexus” of the injury to themselves and the constitutional violation of the statute. In this case, the statute only directly affects plaintiff Craig. Only indirectly does it affect the vendor, Whitener, the third party. The Supreme Court explains that Whitener and other vendors have standing “by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties who seek access to their market or function”.

DECISION: Reversed

RULE: The Oklahoma Statue violates the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause by establishing different drinking ages for men and women.

NOTES AND COMMENTS: In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court held that the statute made unconstitutional gender classifications. The Court held that the statistics relied on by the state of Oklahoma were insufficient to show a substantial relationship between the law and the maintenance of traffic safety. Generalities about the drinking habits of aggregate groups did not suffice. The Court also found that the Twenty-first Amendment did not alter the application of the Equal Protection Clause in the case.

FACTS: Mr. Billy Taylor claimed that his constitutional rights to a jury drawn from a venire constituting a fair cross section of the community were violated because of the Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure which disallowed the selection of women for the jury who had not filed a written declaration of her desire to be subject to jury service.

ISSUE: Is a jury selection system which operates to exclude an identifiable class of citizens from jury service is in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?

REASONING: Mr. Justice White: In the constitutional context, the Court has unambiguously declared that the American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. A unanimous Court stated in Smith v. Texas, that it is part of the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a body truly representative of the community. To exclude racial groups from jury service was said to be at war with our basic concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.

The unmistakable import of this Court’s opinions, at least since 1941, Smith v. Texas, and not repudiated by intervening decisions, is that the selection of a petit jury from a representative cross section of the community is essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. If the fair cross-section rule is to govern the selection of juries, as we have concluded it must, women cannot be systematically from jury panels are drawn.

DECISION: Reversed and Remanded.

RULE: The fair cross-section requirement is violated by the systematic exclusion of women, who in the judicial district here amounted to 53% of the citizens eligible for jury service.

DISSENTING: Mr. Justice Rehnquist: The Court’s opinion reverses a conviction without a suggestion, much less a showing, that the appellant has been unfairly treated or prejudiced in any way by the manner in which his jury was selected. In so doing, the Court invalidates a jury selection system which it approved only 12 years ago. I disagree with the Court and would affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Louisiana.

The Court stated its belief that jury trial for serious offenses is essential for preventing miscarriages of justice and for assuring that fair trials are provided for all defendants. I cannot conceive that todays decision is necessary to guard against oppressive or arbitrary law enforcement, or to prevent miscarriages of justice and to assure fair trials. Especially is this so when the criminal defendant involved makes no claims of prejudice or bias.

The court does accord some slight attention to justifying its ruling in terms of the basis on which the right to jury trial was read into the Fourteenth Amendment. It concludes that the jury is not effective, as a prophylaxis against arbitrary prosecutorial and judicial power, the if jury pool is made up of only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups or excluded from the pool. It fails however to provide any satisfactory explanation of the mechanism by which the Louisiana system undermines to prophylactic role of the jury, either in general or in this case.

]]> http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/2009/09/30/billy-taylor-v-louisiana-419-u-s-522-1975/feed/ 0 naomichaney http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/2009/09/26/sotw-8-plain-brioche-stitch/ http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/2009/09/26/sotw-8-plain-brioche-stitch/#comments Sat, 26 Sep 2009 16:00:56 +0000 naomichaney http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/?p=165 ]]> The brioche stitch may seem complicated at first, but can be quickly mastered. Included here are instructions for the plain brioche stitch with both even and uneven stitches. Note: Brioche stitch knits up loosely and is much wider than it is tall so you will need to plan on more rows than if knitting normally. Free PDF, instructions, patterns and videos after the jump.

Free PDF

Abbreviations:

yf sl yo: bring the working yarn to the front of the work, slip the next stitch purlwise, bring the yarn over the slipped stitch to the back to work the next stitch.

brk: knit the stitch, which was slipped in the previous row, along with its yarnover partner.

Directions: Cast on even number of stitches

Prep Row: [yf sl1 yo, k1] repeat until end

Row 1: [yf sl1 yo, brk 1] repeat until end

Repeat row 1 until desired length.

Directions: Cast on odd number of stitches

Prep Row: [yf sl1 yo, k1] repeat until one stitch left yf sl1 yo.

Row 1: while keeping the yo from the prep row [yf sl1 yo, brk1] repeat until end

Row 2: yf sl1 yo, [brk1, yf sl yo] repeat until end.

Repeat rows 1-2 until desired length.

Free Patterns using this stitch:

1. Scarf
2. Neckwarmer
3. Facecloth
4. Dishcloth

Instructional Videos:

1. Prep Row – english
2. Prep Row – combined
3. Brioche Stitch

• 1 cup pumpkin puree
• 1/3 cup sugar
• 1/2 teaspoon cinnamon
• 1/3 teaspoon ground clove
• 1/3 teaspoon allspice
• pinch of ginger
• 1 egg
• 5 oz evaporated milk

Instructions:

Gut and quarter a pie pumpkin, steam the pumpkin for 30 minutes or until fork tender (like mashed potatoes) then puree the pumpkin, I do so in the same mixer that I will later add all of my ingredients in.

Preheat oven to 425

Measure out how much pumpkin you have then add all the ingredients above and mix until combined.

Add pie mixture (it will be soupy) to the pie crust, bake at 425 for 15 minutes.

Lower temp. to 350, bake for an additional 45-60 minutes or until a knife inserted into the center of the pie comes out clean.

FACTS: An Idaho statute states that if other qualifications for being administrator of a particular estate are equal, then “males must be preferred to females.” In this case a probate judge appointed Cecil Reed the administrator of he and his ex-wife’s deceased son’s estate, citing no grounds other than to comply with the statute. Sally Reed appealed the decision, which was overturned by the district court, when they deemed the statute unconstitutional. The Idaho Supreme Court, after further appeal, upheld Cecil Reed’s appointment. The U.S. Supreme Court held, in a unanimous decision, that it was arbitrary and thus not reasonable to classify women in such a manner.

ISSUE: Is the Idaho statute stating that males must be preferred to females if other qualifications for being administrator of a particular estate are equal constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause?

REASONING: Chief Justice Burger: The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies states the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).

DECISION: Reversed and remanded

RULE: The Idaho statute stating that males must be preferred to females if other qualifications for being administrator of a particular estate are equal is not constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.

NOTES AND COMMENTS: This case set an important precedent for Women’s Rights cases, it has been cited in cases such as Frontiero, as precedent for treating women differently than men when all other circumstances are alike is unconstitutional.

FACTS: Under federal law male members of the uniformed services automatically received an extra housing allowance and medical benefits if they were married. For a servicewoman to receive these additional benefits she must prove that she paid more than one half of her husbands living expenses. Sharron Frontiero could only prove that she paid three-sevenths her husband Joseph Frontiero’s living expenses. Because of this her application for benefits was denied, she filed suit in federal district court whom also denied her claim and she appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Does this Federal Law which classifies uniformed service-members by gender for the distribution of benefits violate the equal protection section of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause?

REASONING: Justice Brennan: Although the position of women in America has improved markedly in recent decades, throughout much of the 19th century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable to that of blacks under the pre-civil War slave codes. Women, however, still face pervasive, although at times more subtle, discrimination.

Sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic; consequently, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility. The sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society. Statutory distinctions between the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females to inferior legal statute without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual members. Classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. To this we agree and, indeed, find at least implicit support for such an approach in our unanimous decision only last term in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71(1971).

In Reed, the Court considered the constitutionality of an Idaho statute providing that when two individuals are otherwise equally entitled to appointment as an administrator of an estate the male applicant must be preferred to the female. The Court held this statutory preference for male applicants unconstitutional.

Congress’s requirement that female, but not male, military personnel must prove the dependency of their spouses to receive spousal benefits serves no purpose other than mere administrative convenience. The statutory scheme which draws a sharp line between the sexes, solely for the purpose of achieving administrative convenience, necessarily commands dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated and therefore involves the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.

DECISION: Reversed

RULE: The federal law which classifies service-members by gender by gender for benefit distribution does violate the equal protection section of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.

CONCURRING: Justice Stewart: agreeing that the statutes before us work an invidious discrimination in violation of the Constitution. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71.

Justice Powell, with Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun: The challenged statutes constitute an unconstitutional  discrimination against service women in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but I cannot join in the opinion of MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, which would hold that all classifications based on gender are “inherently suspect and must  therefore be subject to close judicial scrutiny.”

It is unnecessary for the Court in this case to characterize sex as a suspect classification, with all of the far-reaching implications of such a holding. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71(1971) which supports our opinion today, did not add sex to the limited group of classifications which are inherently suspect. In my opinion we can and should decide this case on the authority of Reed. Another reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the strictest test of judicial scrutiny is the impending Equal Rights Amendment; if this is adopted it will resolve the substance of this precise question.

NOTES AND COMMENTS: It was very satisfying to me, to see the Bradley opinion for the Bradwell case be used as an example of how ridiculously and atrociously the notion of paternalistic attitude affected our nation.  It was also very satisfying to see the trend towards equality being set in motion at the Supreme Court level, while this is not the first case in our history that sided with women being as deserving of the same rights and treatments as men it is the first brief I have done in this class that decided a case in a manner I am happy with.  While, I do wish that sex became a suspect classification at this point, and that the ERA would have been ratified I will surely take joy in knowing that our service-women have the same access to benefits for their husbands as service-men do their wives.

This weeks stitch is the Fish Scale Lace! Sounds pretty gross huh, well please know that it is a lot nicer looking than it sounds by the title I so lovingly gave it… Free PDF and Patterns behind the jump.

Free PDF!

Directions: Directions: Cast on multiples of 11 stitches.

Row 1: *K1, YO, K3, SK2P, K3, YO, K1, rep from *

All WS Rows Purl

Row 3: * K2, YO, K2, SK2P, K2, YO, K2, rep from *

Row 5: * K3, YO, K1, SK2P, K1, YO, K3, rep from *

Row 7: K4, YO, SK2P, YO, K4, rep from *

Repeat rows 1-8 until desired length is reached, BO

Free Patterns:

1. Meret
2. Fingerless Mitts (Ravelry Link)
3. Scarf

]]> http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/2009/09/12/sotw-7-fish-scale-lace/feed/ 0 naomichaney IMG_1705 http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/2009/09/09/muller-v-oregon-208-u-s-412-1908/ http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/2009/09/09/muller-v-oregon-208-u-s-412-1908/#comments Thu, 10 Sep 2009 00:58:09 +0000 naomichaney http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/?p=151 ]]> NOTES AND COMMENTS: The Muller decision essentially made the denial of certain jobs to women a constitutionally protected practice. With women being unable to work more than 10 hours in a day in a mechanical establishment, laundry or factory it would be lawful for potential employers to deny a woman a position at such an establishment should the shift be more than ten hours long. In addition to potentially making certain jobs, men only jobs the decision/opinion of the court painted women as second class citizens requiring special treatment from the law and men in general. Women were painted as helpless creatures unable to fend for themselves; and while I do approve of maximum hours legislation and the protections that stem from such laws (improved mental and physical health, and the very important work life balance), I do not approve of the sexism invoked in this law and especially in the opinion of the court.

FACTS: Oregon state law bars the employment of women in “mechanical establishments” for more than 10 hours in a day. Muller was convicted of violating this labor law, he appealed his conviction to the Oregon Supreme Court citing the Lochner decision which held maximum hour laws to be unconstitutional.

The Oregon Supreme Court upheld the law and he appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court which also upheld the constitutionality of the law, not by overruling Lochner but by differentiating Muller’s case on the basis of “the difference between the sexes”, and the role that plays in the health of women.

ISSUE: Does the state of Oregon law that forbids the employment of women in factories, laundries and other mechanical establishments for any longer than 10 hours a day violate the rights and liberties of women under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution?

REASONING: Justice Brewer: It is the law of Oregon that women, whether married or single, have equal contractual and personal rights with men. It thus appears that they stand on the same plane as the other sex. Their rights in these respects can no more be infringed than the equal rights of their brothers. We held in Lochner that a law providing that no laborer work more than sixty hours in a week or ten hours in a day was not, as to men, a legitimate exercise of the police power of a state, but an unreasonable, unnecessary, and arbitrary interference with the rights and liberties of the individual to contract in relation to his labor, and as such was in conflict with and void under [the Fourteenth Amendment of] the Federal Constitution. That decision is invoked by a plaintiff in error as decisive of the question before us. But this assumes that the difference between the sexes does not justify a different rule respecting a restriction of the hours of labor.

A woman’s physical structure and the performance of maternal functions place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long time on her feet at work, repeating this from day to day, tends to injurious effects upon the body, and as healthy mothers are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being of woman becomes an object of public interest and care in order to preserve the strength and vigor of the race.

DECISION: Affirmed.

RULE: Oregon’s limit of the working hours of women was constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment, because it was justified by the state interest in protecting women’s health.

]]> http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/2009/09/09/muller-v-oregon-208-u-s-412-1908/feed/ 0 naomichaney http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/2009/09/05/sotw-6-cables/ http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/2009/09/05/sotw-6-cables/#comments Sat, 05 Sep 2009 16:00:35 +0000 naomichaney http://naomichaney.wordpress.com/?p=125 ]]> Okay, cables are more of a technique than a stitch and there are about a billion different ways to utilize them but this week I plan on explaining basic cables and how to read the abbreviations for cables. Cables are a type of knitting where stitches are being moved into a different order before being knit either by transferring them to a cable needle (DPN’s of the same size also work well, and in my experience lower the chances to dropping stitches off the cable needle) or by simply moving the stitches around on the needle before knitting (video link).

Though cables can vary in design and complexity there are two basic cables that are the foundation of all cable designs; the left slanting cable and the right slanting cable.  When creating a left slanted cable the cable needle will be held in front of your work and when creating a right slanted cable the needle will be held to the rear of your work. I remember this by associating the “r” in right with the one in rear.

In reading the abbreviation for a cable there are two main things to look at, first the number of stitches involved in the cable and second the direction. Once you are comfortable reading this information you will be able to tackle any complex cable pattern.  This week I am going to focus on a two cable braid with six stitches per cable. This would be abbreviated as 6-st LC or 6-st RC. The number six lets you know that you will bring half of the stitches (3) onto the cable needle and then hold it to either the front (LC) or back (RC) of the work.

To obtain the 2 cable braid using 6 stitch cables you would cast on 9 stitches (because we want the middle three stitches of each cable to be shared (6+6-3=9)).

K all of row’s 1+5;

P all WS rows;

Row 3: 6-st LC, K3

Row 7: K3, 6-st RC

Repeating this 8 row pattern would give you a 2 cable rope/braid.

Videos:

Cableing without Cable Needles

ISSUE: Are the provisions of the constitution and the laws of the state of Missouri which confine the right of suffrage and registration to men alone in violation of the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?

REASONING: There is no doubt that women may be citizens. They are persons, and by the fourteenth amendment ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof’ are expressly declared to be ‘citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.’ But, in our opinion, it was not this amendment that made women citizens. Before its adoption the Constitution of the United States did not in terms prescribe who should be citizens of the United States or of the several States, yet there were necessarily such citizens without such provision. Each one of the persons associated becomes a member of the nation formed by the association. For convenience it has been found necessary to give a name to this membership. The object is to designate by a title the person and the relation he bears to the nation. For this purpose the words ‘subject,’ ‘inhabitant,’ and ‘citizen’ have been used, and the choice between them is sometimes made to depend upon the form of the government. When used in this sense it is understood as conveying the idea of membership of a nation, and nothing more.
Disputes have arisen as to whether or not certain persons or certain classes of persons were part of the people at the time, but never as to their citizenship if they were. Other proof of like character might be found, but certainly more cannot be necessary to establish the fact that sex has never been made one of the elements of citizenship in the United States. In this respect men have never had an advantage over women. The same laws precisely apply to both. The fourteenth amendment did not affect the citizenship of women any more than it did of men. Therefore, the rights of Mrs. Minor do not depend upon the amendment. She has always been a citizen from her birth, and entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizenship.
The Constitution does not define the privileges and immunities of citizens. For that definition we must look elsewhere. In this case we need not determine what they are, but only whether suffrage is necessarily one of them. It certainly is nowhere made so in express terms. The United States has no voters in the States of its own creation. The elective officers of the United States are all elected directly or indirectly by State voters.
The amendment did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen. It simply furnished an additional guaranty for the protection of such as he already had. No new voters were necessarily made by it. Indirectly it may have had that effect, because it may have increased the number of citizens entitled to suffrage under the constitution and laws of the States, but it operates for this purpose, if at all, through the States and the State laws, and not directly upon the citizen. It is clear, therefore, we think, that the Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and immunities of citizenship as they existed at the time it was adopted.

DECISION: Affirmed

RULE: The provisions of the constitution and the laws of the state of Missouri which confine the right of suffrage and registration to men alone are not in violation of the Privileges and Immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

CONCURRING: No concurring or dissenting opinions were provided.